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Introduction
There is a growing number of studies on financial integration in various regional integration projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (see e.g. UNECA and AU, 2008; UNECA and SADC, 2010; Lovegrove et al., 2007; Bhatia, 2009; Jansen and Vennes, 2006) . These contributions strongly (and sometimes exclusively) emphasise the potential merits of regional financial integration (RFI) resulting from economies of scale; stimuli for domestic financial reforms; increased competition and innovation; expanded opportunities for risk diversification; etc. These assumed benefits are predominantly based on theoretical arguments that are habitually made both in the debate on financial globalisation and RFI. The key assertion in the literature is that RFI is beneficial since it entails financial development. The empirical evidence, however, is lacking.
Against this backdrop, the aim of this study is to critically review the arguments made in the literature and examine whether measurable effects of RFI on financial market development and access to finance exist in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. RFI is defined as the process of opening up capital accounts among countries of geographical proximity, including a liberalisation of cross-border activities of financial institutions within the integrating area. This process is two-dimensional, caused by market forces (e.g., foreign bank penetration) and political institutionalisation (e.g., harmonisation of payment systems, regulatory harmonisation, and regional institutional development). RFI is to be distinguished from global financial integration (or financial globalisation), which refers to a country's entrance in global financial markets by removing its capital controls vis-à-vis other countries (cf. García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007, p. 58) . In particular, this study investigates whether and how countries involved in a RFI project differ from other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of financial development and firm's financing conditions. For this purpose, we gather data on financial market development, cost of and access to finance, cross border financial flows, membership in an RFI project, and institutional development from various sources (including IMF (2008) ; Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2010); World Bank and International Financial Corporation (2010) ; Knack (1999) ) and apply cross-country regressions based on an approach first proposed by Chinn and Ito (2006) . Our results suggest that RFI positively affects financial development when combined with a sufficient level of institutional quality. However, we also find that RFI appears to have negative effects on access to finance for small enterprises.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The following section defines the relevant key terms. Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature on the benefits and costs of international and regional financial integration. Section 4 gives a brief overview of the regional context, i.e. financial markets in Sub-Saharan Africa and the three Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In Section 5 we then investigate empirically the effects of RFI on financial development and financing conditions for enterprises in SSA. Section 6 concludes.
De jure measures aim to quantify the degree of legal restrictions on capital movements (e.g. Chinn and Ito, 2006) . Since the formal removal of capital controls does not necessarily imply the actual occurrence of cross-border capital flows, de facto measure try to estimate the amount of capital exchanged between economies (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003) .
Given serious constraints on data availability of bilateral financial flows in SSA, we have to suffice with a de jure measure of RFI that assesses legal restrictions on capital flows. To this end, we apply a qualitative approach. In particular, we regard an REC as an RFI project if it meets the two following conditions. First, a formal agreement must be met by all member countries on all topics listed in Table  2 .1. Those criteria are regarded by UNECA and SADC (2010) as key elements of RFI. Second, there must be no overlapping membership by a significant number of member countries with other RFI projects. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (2011) argue that overlapping membership structures negatively affect the implementation of RFI due to potential political dissent. We thus exclude RECs which meet the first condition but have overlapping memberships on the assumption that RFI implementation is not highly developed in RECs with overlapping memberships. UNECA and SADC (2010) 
Theoretical considerations
This section reviews the theoretical literature on financial integration. It is structured in two parts. First, we review the theoretical costs and benefits of financial integration, regardless whether it takes place in regional or a global context. We then discuss some specific aspects relating to RFI that are not relevant in the case of financial globalisation. In order to keep the descriptions short, we will concentrate on the arguments relevant to developing countries.
Financial integration: Benefits and reservations

Benefits
Most of the theoretical literature maintains that financial integration is beneficial because it entails macroeconomic growth and stability (cf., García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007) . While most of the proponents of financial integration agree on this, there are diverging views on the transmission channels through which financial integration effects growth and stability.
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The arguments can be structured in two groups. The first group represents an "earlier wave of financial globalisation literature" (Kose et al., 2006b, p. 1) deriving from the neoclassical tradition. The arguments of the second group are more recent and were mostly developed as a response to a lack of empirical evidence for the earlier theoretical predictions. The first group asserts that financial integration achieves macroeconomic growth and stability directly, whereas the second group proposes that the effects are rather indirect (see Mishkin, 2007) .
Direct effects of financial integration: The early literature encompasses four direct benefits of financial integration: increased domestic investment, spill-over effects of foreign direct investment, consumption smoothing and international risk sharing.
First, financial integration is supposed to enhance domestic investment by providing a larger pool of funds for domestic firms. If a low level of income constraints a country's ability to create large savings, and if the costs of capital on international markets do not exceed the marginal return of domestic investment projects, domestic enterprises can borrow on international capital markets. This should increase domestic investment and economic growth in the respective country.
Proponents of this theoretical view underline the implications of this concept for developing countries. They argue that developing countries have a lower capital-labour ratio. This results -other things equal -in lower marginal labour productivity and lower wages and, given the law of diminishing returns, in a higher marginal product of capital. Therefore, the neoclassical framework predicts that capital should flow from industrialised to developing countries (cf. Lucas, 1990) .
Second, the early literature emphasises the specific benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is described as a transmission channel of technological and managerial knowledge (see e.g. MacDougall, 1960; Borensztein et al., 1998; Berthelemy and Démurger, 2000) . Positive effects of such transfers are, for instance, higher skilled human capital and lower costs to introduce new varieties of capital (see Borensztein et al., 1998 , for a formal exposition).
Third, financial integration should enable countries to borrow funds from international capital markets in times of economic distress and lend in better times, Financial integration should thus lead to consumption smoothing. By reducing the volatility of consumption, financial integration it therefore expected to positively affect macroeconomic stability (e.g., Agénor, 2010) .
In a similar manner, risk diversification is regarded as an important benefit of financial integration. Investors who are residents of a financially integrated country can diversify between different types of domestic and foreign assets. Thereby, risk can be shared internationally which allows aggregate reduction of risk and higher macroeconomic stability (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998) . This is highly relevant for developing countries whose domestic markets provide little opportunity for asset diversification, which is often related to low diversification of the real economy. Indirect benefits of financial integration: The traditional theory has been seriously challenged on two grounds. First, empirical research does not find a positive correlation between financial integration and economic growth (cf. Kose et al., 2006b) , and sometimes even a negative one (cf. Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007; Prasad et al., 2007) . Second, international investment flows do not show the patterns predicted by neoclassical theory. In contrary, capital flows rather from developing to industrialised countries, as it has been outlined by Lucas (1990) .
As a response, the newer theoretical literature emphasises the indirect benefits of financial integration. Kose et al. (2006b Kose et al. ( , 2007 provide a framework for the indirect benefits of financial integration. They argue that the merits of financial integration manifest in "collateral benefits" (Kose et al., 2007, p. 44) . This term describes unintended, yet positive, side-effects of financial integration. Kose et al. identify three main susceptible areas for such collateral benefits: financial sector development, institutional quality, and macroeconomic policy.
Financial development -defined as an increase in the size and the efficiency of the financial sector (Mishkin, 2007) -can be enhanced by the penetration of foreign financial institutions into the integrating country. As argued by Mishkin (2007) as well as Rajan and Zingales (2003) one important potential consequence of financial integration is the reduction of financial repression. Financial repression describes a situation where a country's financial system is poorly developed because powerful politico-economic actors (so-called "incumbents") prevent further development of the financial system. The involvement of foreign financial institutions can break open such structures characterised by monopolies, government-owned financial institutions or both, leading to more efficient and less costly financial intermediation and, hence, financial development (see Baldwin and Forslid, 2000) .
Furthermore, the entrance of foreign financial intermediaries should also stimulate institutional development. Foreign institutions from countries with higher regulatory standards may introduce "best practices" (Mishkin, 2007) to the financial sector of the host country, and thus help to implement prudential regulation and improve the stability of the domestic financial sector. Due to their outsider status, they have an interest in minimising information asymmetries which typically represent a more severe problem for foreign financial institutions than for domestic ones. Therefore, international financial institutions have an incentive to enforce accounting standards and regulations (Mishkin, 2007) .
And finally, international financial integration is viewed as having positive effects on a country's macroeconomic policy. Inadequate economic policies, like unsustainable fiscal policies or a malfunctioning regulatory system, are thought to encourage capital outflows and, consequently, higher domestic interest rates. This creates pressure on policymakers and therefore an incentive for them to implement prudential macroeconomic policies (Obstfeld, 1998; Kose et al., 2007) .
Obstacles, limits, and costs
Having outlined the potential benefits of financial integration as predicted by theory, we will now turn to the potential problems associated with financial integration. We will first discuss the "threshold conditions" for successful financial integration and succinctly review the potential costs that international financial integration might entail.
Threshold conditions for successful financial integration
An insufficient economic, political, or institutional environment can counteract the merits of financial integration. That, in turn, implies that certain prerequisites must be prevalent in an integrating country to allow it to benefit from financial integration. Kose et al. (2006b, p. 35) term those prerequisites "threshold conditions". They identify four such thresholds: financial sector development, institutional quality, quality of domestic macroeconomic policies, and trade integration. According to them, the absence or insufficiency of any of the threshold conditions can limit or counteract potential positive effects of financial integration.
Financial development is important for financial integration, because a larger and more efficient financial sector is more likely to channel capital inflows to its most productive uses. However, this channelling of capital inflows will be limited if the financial sector is poorly developed.
Institutional quality is also important because it mainly affects "not just the outcomes of financial integration but the actual level of integration" (Kose et al., 2006b p. ) , since economic and political institutions constitute the framework for the implementation of financial integration.
Similarly, the quality of macroeconomic policies affects the composition of inflows, since sound policies tend to attract not only more capital inflows, but also relatively more FDI and equity inflows. Such inflows require investors' confidence in the macroeconomic stability of the host country.
Fourthly, Kose et al. point to the importance of a country's exchange rate policy. The "impossible trinity" of international macroeconomics stipulates that countries cannot maintain financial integration, an exchange rate peg, and autonomy of monetary policy at the same time. Therefore, assuming that developing countries need to align their monetary policy -at least to some extenttowards domestic goals, they face a trade-off between financial integration and a pegged exchange rate. For this reason, Kose et al. regard flexible exchange rates as a special threshold condition for financial integration.
Finally, Kose et al. regard trade integration as an important precondition for financial integration, since economies whose real economy is relatively isolated from the rest of the world are more likely to suffer from the effects of financial crises associated with financial integration. Closed economies cannot compensate the contraction of domestic aggregate demand triggered by a financial crisis by exports, and are therefore more vulnerable when opening up their capital markets.
Potential costs of international financial integration
While most of the literature on financial integration has focussed on the supposed benefits of international financial integration, there are also critical perspectives. One potential cost of financial integration derives from its influence on the effectiveness of other macroeconomic policy tools. Opening the capital account is likely to diminish a country's monetary policy autonomy, even if it employs flexible exchange rates.
3
Financial integration can also have adverse effects on the competitiveness of a country's export sector and therefore on overall economic growth. The transmission channel behind those adverse effects is the real exchange rate. When capital flows into a country, it appreciates the country's currency in real terms. This decreases the competitiveness of domestic goods and makes investment in tradables less profitable. Therefore, investment in the export sector recedes and aggregate spending diminishes. This effect is in particularly harmful for developing countries depending on commodity export (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Rodrik, 2008) .
In addition, financial integration can create tremendous costs in the form of financial crises. There are various mechanisms behind the nexus between financial integration and financial crisis. First, an opening of the capital account changes the behaviour of domestic banks. If domestic banks are allowed to lend abroad, this can entail two adverse types of behaviour. On the one hand, banks tend to expand their lending activities abroad in businesses in which they have only limited experience. Typically, the supervisory bodies lack the expertise to supervise the new lending activities of the banks on international capital markets. As a result, the number of non-performing loans of banks 7 increases and the balance sheets of financial institutions begin to deteriorate. If this process continues, banks come under the suspicion of potential or actual failure. This can erode the trust of depositors in their banks leading to bank runs, banks panics, and even more failing institutions (Mishkin, 2007, p. 276) . On the other hand, a similar mechanism can occur with regards to capital inflows. If domestic institutions start to obtain loans from abroad they typically pay high interest rates, while foreign lenders view their investment as being implicitly protected by the host government or the IMF. This impression of safety is reinforced if the country has a fixed exchange rate regime, giving "foreign investors a sense of lower risk" (Mishkin, 2007, p. 276) . This inflow of capital entails excessive lending by financial institutions, either domestically or abroad, thus triggering the same process described above.
Second, financial integration can increase the likelihood of financial crises due to the volatile nature of international capital flows. In extreme cases countries can experience an unanticipated withdrawal of short-term capital -so-called sudden stops (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . Theory provides two explanations for such reversals of capital: herding behaviour and contagion. Contagion describes the phenomenon of a "loss of confidence in the economic prospects of a country, as a result of developments elsewhere" (Agénor, 2010 (Agénor, , p. 1100 . Herding occurs when a high number of investors "charge into risky ventures without adequate information and appreciation of the risk-reward tradeoffs and, at the first sign of trouble, flee to safer havens" (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000, p. 279) . In the absence of capital controls both contagion effects and herding behaviour can cause rapid outflows of capital from an integrated country with adverse economic and social consequences.
Finally, financial integration could also have adverse effects on financing conditions for small enterprises. There are two explanations why financing conditions for small enterprises can be negatively affected in the context of financial integration -the "large bank barriers hypothesis" and the "foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis" (Berger et al., 2001) . The large bank barriers hypothesis argues as follows: efficient lending depends on how much reliable information banks can obtain about their customers. One particularly efficient lending form is "relationship lending" which describes the process of gathering information about borrowers "beyond the relatively transparent data available in the financial statement and other sources" through "contact over time with the firm, its owner, and its local community on a variety of dimensions" (Berger et al., 2001, p. 2) . Large banks find it difficult to extend their lending activities to smaller firms, since they cannot gather information about them via relationship lending. This can lead to reduced lending to smaller enterprises by large financial institutions. As argued by Chick and Dow (1994) , higher competition in the banking sector, which correlates with the international integration of banking, entails a concentration of the banking sector. Financial integration that leads to a concentration in banking could thus result in diminished access to finance for small firms.
In a similar line, the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis argues, similarly to Mishkin (2007) , that foreign banks have disadvantages compared to domestic financial institutions due to information asymmetries. Foreign banks, like large banks, find it typically more difficult to engage in relationship lending and extend credit to smaller businesses which are more likely to encounter problems in adhering to standardised credit procedures than large firms. Foreign banks, therefore, tend to "cherrypick their clients" (Volz, 2008, p. 22) , i.e. they will tend to lend to larger enterprises. Thus, if a financial market is dominated by foreign firms, this can result in sharp credit constraints for small enterprises. 
Regionalism vs. globalisation
Having reviewed the potential benefits of and problems with international financial integration, we will now address some theoretical issues relating specifically to RFI. A number of recent studies argue that RFI is associated with specific benefits others than those of financial globalisation (see e.g. UNECA and AU, 2008; UNECA and SADC, 2010; Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011; Bhatia, 2009; García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007) .
There are three main arguments for RFI -as opposed to integration into global financial markets -in the literature. The first underlines the positive implications of RFI created by cooperation in institutional and political issues. García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007, p. 59) point out that RFI is more likely to generate benefits on the institutional side than financial globalisation because the creation of regional institutions requires a much more intensive engagement in institutional development than the removal of capital controls. With regards to politics, Bhatia et al. (2009, p. 30) argue that RFI can entail benefits in the political sphere by providing "powerful incentive for domestic financial reforms". Although those arguments correctly state that RFI puts a stronger focus on institutional development and policy issues, they are just another version of the collateral benefits argument proposed by Kose et al. (2006a) . They merely state that the degree of those benefits should be higher in RFI than in financial globalisation.
A second group of arguments emphasises the effects of RFI on financial development in terms of size and efficiency. Concerning the size of the financial sector, UNECA and SADC (2010, p. 5) asserts that "bringing together scarce savings" is a major merit of RFI. From this point of view RFI serves as a pooling mechanism to consolidate otherwise lowly developed financial markets to a larger market for funds available to potential private debtors in the region. With regard to the efficiency of financial intermediation, García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007) argue that geographical proximity can mitigate information asymmetries, due to a more extensive exchange of information. This allows a more efficient allocation of financial resources. Correspondingly, Bhatia et al. (2009, p. 30) assert that "RFI reduces transaction costs and increases the effectiveness of financial institutions". This point of view is connected to the notion that RFI entails economies of scale by concentrating financial intermediation within a region. The advantages of economies of scale and less information asymmetries are indeed specific potential features of RFI, relying on the geographical proximity of RFI not given in the case of financial globalisation. In contrast, the argument of the consolidated savings merely replicates the argument of the direct effect of financial integration due to a larger scope of available funds.
A third line of arguments focuses on the positive effects of RFI on financing conditions for enterprises. UNECA and AU (2008, p. 122) highlight the fact that RFI includes "several advantages [...] , particularly for small and medium-sized firms. Integration could also remove certain forms of credit constraints [...] . The law of large numbers guarantees less exposure to credit risk as the number of clients increases". Creditors prefer to provide loans in an RFI area because it enables them to diversify risk among a large group of debtors. This argument draws upon the risk diversification argument outlined in the previous section, although with a focus on its effects on financing conditions for small enterprises. However, as we mentioned earlier, financial integration can also inhibit access to finance for small enterprises. We will examine this aspect in detail in the empirical part of the study.
Negative aspects of RFI are barely discussed in the literature as compared to those of financial integration in general. Some studies mention implementation problems as an obstacle for RFI. One particular problem can occur when different RFI projects with diverging harmonisation standards overlap (see Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011) , i.e. when countries of one RFI project also participate in another project. 
Regional context
The SSA region currently encompasses 14 RECs (Table 4 .1). 4 All of the 47 SSA countries are members of at least one REC. On average SSA countries participate in three economic cooperation projects. Table A .1 shows which countries are members in which REC. Almost all RECs put a strong focus on trade integration, and some are monetary unions. However, only a few of these RECs engage in RFI that meets our definition outlined above. Analysing the political agendas and agreements of the 14 RECs, as well as the literature dealing with politico-economic progress in those regions, with regards to the RFI criteria presented in Table 2 .1 we identified four RECs that tend towards financial market integration (cf. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011) 
East African Community (EAC):
The EAC has focused on the removal of capital restrictions among their founding members within the last decade (see East African Community, 2010a). The treaty establishing the East African Community (1999) highlights the importance of banking and capital market integration. It focuses on the harmonisation of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks (Article 85b), promotion of "co-operation among the stock-exchanges, capital markets and securities' regulators" (Article 85g), as well the harmonisation of "capital market policies on cross-border listing, foreign portfolio investors, taxation of capital market transactions, accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards, procedures for setting commissions and other charges" (Article 85c). Furthermore, the member countries agreed to "ensure the unimpeded flow of capital within the Community" (Article 86a). Recently the EAC has put a stronger emphasis on the harmonisation of payment systems by setting up the East African Payment System (EAPS) (see East African Community, 2010b; African Trade Policy Centre, 2010). Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) : In UEMOA there are no legal restrictions on capital in-and outflows (cf. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011) .
Union Économique et Monétaire
5 Since 2004, banks are allowed to operate in all member countries with one single permit (cf. Sy, 2007) . Various institutions have been created on a regional level. For example, the supervision and regulation of the entire banking sector in the region is conducted by the Commission Bancaire de l'UEMOA, which is controlled by the regional central banks (cf. Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 2008a). There is a regional stock and bond market -the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières. It was created in 1998 and is supervised by the regional supervisory commission Conseil Régional de l'Epargne Publique et de Marchés Financiers (cf. Sy, 2007, p. 99) . Furthermore, the UEMOA set up the so called Syst`eme de Transfert Automatis´e et de Règlement dans l'UEMOA (STAR-UEMOA) which implements modern payment systems on a regional level (cf. Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l 'Ouest, 2008b 'Ouest, , 2006 . 
Communauté Économique et
Common Monetary Area (CMA):
The CMA member countries have formally agreed on the removal of capital controls (cf. Wang et al., 2007) . In contrast to the other RECs projects, the formal integration process of financial markets in CMA is marked by the supremacy of one dominant player -South Africa. Article 5 of the CMA Agreement states that the prescriptions of the regulation and supervision of the financial markets and the banking sector of South Africa also apply to other CMA member countries (Wang et al., 2007) . The South African Exchange Control Regulations states that "Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland should be treated as part of the domestic territory and not as foreign" (South Africa Government, 2007, p. 4) . Moreover, the payment systems of the small CMA members are aligned to South African standards and "[a]s a result of these structures, the banking sector in all CMA countries complies with international banking standards and regulations" (Metzger, 2008, p. 5) , since South Africa itself implemented international standards in terms of regulation and payment systems. The requirements outlined in Table 2 .1 are therefore met, although the integration process is politically centred in South Africa and not on a supranational basis. Furthermore, the de facto data on RFI activity that are available for the CMA due to higher reporting standards of South African banks show that South African banks are active in the entire CMA region (e.g., Metzger, 2008) . For this reason we consider CMA as an exception with regards to overlapping membership.
RECs with overlapping membership structures: Several other RECs mention financial market integration in their agenda. However, in practice, the focus appears to be on trade integration, with RFI not being a topic of priority. Furthermore, a stronger emphasis on RFI would face various problems on the political level for other RECs "due to a lack of political commitment in member countries" (Khandelwal, 2004, p. 10) . For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) tried to launch a payment system harmonisation project, yet, it lacks serious acceptance by their member countries (see African Trade Policy Centre, 2010), which is arguably due to overlapping memberships (cf. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2011) . Seven countries have a membership in both SADC and COMESA.
6 This is already more than half of all SADC member countries. In fact, no single SADC member is only a SADC member; COMESA only includes three countries which are not members of other RECs. We also find overlapping membership patterns in the cases of the 
Empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of RFI
We now turn to an empirical investigation of the effects of RFI on the financial sectors of SSA countries. We proceed in two steps. We first analyse the effect of RFI on financial development. We then estimate the effects of RFI on the financing conditions of enterprises.
RFI and financial development
An extensive empirical literature investigates the effects of general financial openness on financial development by using cross-country data (see for instance Levine, 1996; Claessens et al., 2001; Chinn and Ito, 2006) or panel data of individual countries (see Barajas et al., 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Unite and Sullivan, 2003) . There is also a growing number of quantitative studies examining the effects of RFI on financial development. An example is Espinoza et al. (2010) who found a positive connection between RFI and stock market development for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
However, empirical research in SSA on RFI is relatively rare. Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (2011) provide some descriptive analysis arguing that member countries of RFI projects do not significantly differ from non-member countries. Jansen and Vennes (2006) compare RFI with international financial integration from the perspective of SSA countries, yet they only identify potential benefits in terms of financial sector efficiency gains. They argue that the gains are higher for financial globalisation than for RFI. In a qualitative investigation Lovegrove et al. (2007) point out that membership in CMA contributes more to financial development than SACU membership. 
Data and methodology
We follow the approach of Chinn and Ito (2006) , who analyse the relation between financial development and general capital account openness with ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, including an interaction term. They measure the degree of general openness with an index (the ChinnIto-Index) which is calculated on the basis of data on legal restrictions of cross-border capital flows from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER; see International Monetary Fund, 2010). They apply their regression to a broad array of least developed countries and emerging markets.
We replicate Chinn and Ito's regression, modifying one variable in order to measure RFI instead of general financial openness. In our specification, the Chinn-Ito-Index is replaced by a dummy (RFI j ), indicating the membership of the respective country in a RFI project (cf. Section 4). Our model specification is as follows:
The variables are defined as follows. The first two indicators measure the size of the financial sector. PCGDP j is a measure of the activity of private financial intermediaries. It is a very common indicator of the size of the financial sector (see e.g. Volz, 2008; Beck et al., 2000) . LIQUID j is the broadest measure of the size of the financial sector. It includes "currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP" (Beck et al., 2010) . NIMG j , CIR j , and OVHD j are all measures of the efficiency of the banking sector. NIMG j denotes the net interest margin. It equals the ratio of the net interest revenues of all banks to their total earning assets. OVHD j equals the overhead costs of all banks as a fraction of their total assets. CIR j is the cost-income ratio of banks. It describes the ratio of the overhead costs of all banks to their gross revenues. High values of these three variables indicate low efficiency of the banking sector. We draw these data from Beck et al. (2010) , whose dataset encompasses various other indicators of the financial structure of SSA countries, including indicators for financial sector efficiency. However, in most of the cases there are large gaps in the dataset, so that the sample size is too small for a regression analysis. This is especially true for data on bond and stock market development. Beck et al. (2010) also provide detailed explanations about the calculation method on which the data are based.
As was pointed out, our regression will not include level data for the dependent variable, but the four year average growth rates of the indicators described above. The growth rates are shown in Beck et al. (2010) .
RFI:
We measure RFI j with a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country is a member of an RFI project, and 0, if not. We argued in Section 4 that CMA, UEMOA, CEMAC, and EAC should be regarded as RFI projects. The country dummy of country j thus takes the value 1, if it has been a member in one of those four RECs in 2004 (cf. We are aware that the usage of such a coarse indicator for the RFI j variable limits the explanatory power and reliability of our analysis. However, given the lack of data for bilateral financial flows for most countries in SSA, we consider this to be the only feasibly approach to investigate the effects of RFI in this region. 7 We will discuss the various negative implications on the interpretability of our results in detail below.
Institutional development:
In Section 3 we mentioned that various studies highlight institutional development as an important precondition for deriving positive effects from RFI. We thus include a variable for institutional development to test its role in enhancing financial development.
To measure institutional quality we rely on indicators from three different sources: the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank (2010d) In addition, we include an interactive term, RFI j(t−4) L j , which shows the combined effect of institutional development and RFI on financial development. We already pointed out that theory predicts a positive relation between institutional and financial development. Furthermore, institutional 7 We also tested the Chinn-Ito-Index in our regression instead of the RFI dummy. Unfortunately, this index has the same value for almost all SSA countries and, therefore, provides no interpretable results. Furthermore, it is not a measure for RFI but for general financial openness. Thus, it does not contribute to the research question at hand.
8 Other studies, including Chinn and Ito (2006) , use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to measure institutional development. However, those data are available only publicly available for the years 1984 to 1997 (which is the timespan that Chinn and Ito used for their regressions). Running the regression with the ICRG data leads to results which are very similar to those reported below. However, given that the ICRG data are somewhat outdated we refrain from reporting the results here; they are available on request. Apart from the ICRG data, Chinn and Ito (2006) employ the legal measures provided by La Porta et al. (1998) which are commonly used as indicators of institutional quality. However, since this dataset includes only four SSA countries it cannot be used for our purposes.
development is seen as a prerequisite as well as an indirect benefit of RFI (cf. Kose et al., 2006a) . We thus expect the combined effect of RFI and institutional development in our regression results to be positive.
Control variables:
Finally a vector of control variables is included in the specification. While the literature provides theoretical justification of a broad array of variables that could be determinants of financial development, there is no consensus on which variables should be included in an estimation. Here we will follow Chinn and Ito (2006) and apply only a small set of control variables, due to our small sample size. In particular, we use the natural log of GDP in 2004 (GDP j ), average inflation between 2004 and 2008 (CPI j ), and trade openness in 2004 (OPENEC j , which is the ratio of imports and exports to GDP). Higher financial development is associated with more complex economic structures that go along with higher income. High inflation distorts the decision processes of economic actors and may encourage them to save in real goods rather than financial assets. The link between financial development and trade openness is supported by empirical literature (Beck, 2002) . The sources for the data are Beck et al. (2010) , World Bank (2010c), and Heston et al. (2009) , respectively. Furthermore, we include the level of financial development in 2004 ) as a control variable. This variable is included because the initial level of financial development is likely to influence the growth rates of the following period.
Results
Tables 5. [2] [3] [4] [5] .6 depict the results of our regression analysis. Tables 5.2., 5.3. and 5.4 present the estimations for each indicator of institutional development from the WGI dataset (CC j , ROL j , and RQ j ). Table 5 .5 shows the results for the CPIA j data, and Table 5 .6 reports the results for the SFI j . In each Table, Columns 1 to 5 display the results for the sample including all SSA countries for the different measures of financial development. Columns 6 to 10 show the results when outliers are excluded. 9 There are no problems with multicollinearity.
The results in Tables 5.2 -5.4 show significant coefficients for the RFI j variable when the dependent variable is LIQUID j and outliers are excluded. At the same time, we find significant coefficients for the institutional development variables ROL j and RQ j in the LIQUID j regression when outliers are excluded. CPIA j also has a significant coefficient in the LIQUID j regression.
However, since our specification includes an interactive term, we cannot interpret the coefficients of RFI j or the institutional quality variables independently. If we want to filter out the influence of RFI on financial development, we have to calculate the total effect of RFI j (cf. Chinn and Ito, 2006) . This is done for a given value of institutional quality by summing up the effects of the RFI j variable and the interaction term predicted by our model. Furthermore, if the OLS coefficient estimate of the interaction term is significant, then the total effect is also significant. Therefore, we can calculate the total effect for the results where we find a significant estimate (with p < 0.05) for the interactive term, i.e., Column 7 of Table 5 .2, 5.3, 5.4. and 5.6. 10 An overview of the total effects is given in Table 5 .7
9 A value is defined as an outlier when it is two standard deviations above or below the average (cf. Chinn and Ito, 2006) . 10 We calculate the total effects presented in Table 5 .
as (FD j(t-4) -FD j )* = α 1 RFI j(t-4) +α 3 (RFI j(t-4) L j )s+x M .
The equation shows the total effect (indicated by the asterisk) of the variable RFI j(t−4) on the annual growth rate of financial development FD j(t−4) − FD j for a given level of institutional quality L j . s denotes the standard deviation and x M the mean of the annual growth rate of financial development. The effect of joining an RFI project is the difference between the total effect when RFI j is one and the total effect, when it is zero. If it is zero, for the non-RFI countries. 11 The results have to be interpreted carefully. They show us how, according to our model predictions, the financial sector size of an individual country would be affected if the respective country joined an RFI project, given its respective level of institutional quality.
For example, a country like Madagascar, which has an average control of corruption index of minus 0.096 (on a scale between minus 2.5 and 2.5), would increase its growth rate of liquid liabilities by 6.1 percent, whereas Nigeria, with a CC j value of minus 1.11, would find its liquid liabilities ratio decreasing by 5.8 percent. Similarly, Cape Verde which has an average rule of law index of 0.518 (also on a minus 2.5 to 2.5 scale) would increase the average growth rate of its liquid liabilities by 12 percent, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo would experience a decline by 10.8 percent due to a low rule of law index of minus 1.73.
When using RQ j as a measure of institutional development we find that the growth rate of Liberia's liquid liabilities to GDP ratio would decrease by 12.3 percent because RQ j accounts for minus 1.53. In contrast, the growth rate of Mauritius' financial sector is estimated to increase by 16.7 percent due to its regulatory quality index of 0.53.
Using SFI j as a measure of institutional development, the results are again in line with the previous estimations. For instance, the growth rate of the financial sector of Sierra Leone would be negatively affected by RFI decreasing by 11.4 percent due to its relatively high level of state fragility (21 on a scale between 23 and zero). The opposite is true for Ghana which has a SFI j of only 14 and would see the growth rate of its financial sector increase by 4.8 percent according to our estimations.
The results in Table 5 .7 are largely consistent, irrespective of which institutional development indicator is used. The effect of RFI on the growth rate of liquid liabilities to GDP for the average level of institutional quality is minus 0.2 percent for the CC j variable, minus 1 percent for the rule of law variable, minus 3 percent for RQ j , and minus 3.3 for the SFI j . This implies that on average the effects of RFI on financial sector development in SSA is rather small or negative given the relatively low level of institutional development prevalent in most SSA countries. Overall, our results reconfirm earlier contributions that have emphasised the importance of the economic, political and institutional environment for successful financial integration.
Furthermore we can calculate the average level of institutional development which is necessary to enable a positive effect of RFI on financial development. We find that, in terms of the control of corruption index, a minimum level of minus 0.62 is required to channel RFI to an increase in the size of the financial sector in terms of liquid liabilities to GDP. The rule of law index must be at least 0.67 and the regulatory quality index at least 0.64. The SFI j must not exceed 16 in order to make RFI beneficial in terms of growth benefits of the financial sector. We can interpret these values as the threshold conditions described by Kose et al. (2006b) . Our results suggest that countries with low institutional quality should be careful or even stay away from engaging in RFI until their institutional quality has reached a level where they can actually benefit from RFI. This underlines the great importance of getting the sequencing of financial opening right to avoid adverse effects.
However, one has to be cautious in interpreting Table 5 .7. The estimated effects for some countries are very high, and they should not be understood as an elaborate prediction of the effects of RFI on a the whole equation becomes zero too. Therefore, the total effect of RFI on financial development is: (FD j(t-4) -FD j )* = α 1 +α 3 L j s+x M . 11 We restrict our analysis to non-RFI countries, since the interpretation of the total effect of RFI membership on countries that are already involved in RFI projects makes little economic sense. It would show us the effect of RFI on a RFI member country for the hypothetical situation that the respective country was not an RFI member. single country, but rather as an illustration of the relation between institutional development and the effectiveness of RFI for financial development.
A few more qualifications are apposite. First, the effects calculated in Table 5 .7 are based on the assumption that differences in the effect of RFI j on LIQUID j are causally determined by differences in the level of institutional quality. This interpretation derives from the threshold conditions argument stated by Kose et al. (2006a) . However, the data provide no insight into the establishment of causality. It could also be possible that institutional quality has a different effect on the relation of institutional quality and LIQUID j depending on the value of RFI j .
12 Our interpretation is therefore based on theoretical reasoning, not on information we extracted from the data analysis.
Second, since we only obtained significant results in Columns 2 and 8 of Table 5 .3 and Column 7 of Table 5 .5. we could only discuss the effects of RFI on the size of the financial sector measured as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. This measure, however, also includes the liabilities of the central bank. Therefore, our results give no information about the particular effect of RFI on the size of the private financial sector. This limitation becomes even more severe for the interpretability of our results with respect to the fact that the private financial sector in most SSA countries is relatively shallow compared to central bank liabilities. Based on data from Beck et al. (2010) , we can calculate the average ratio of deposit money banks to central bank assets. It accounts for 23.75 percent. This supports the notion that our results may display the effect of RFI on central bank liabilities rather than on the size of the private financial sector.
Overall, our results suggest that RFI affects the overall size of the financial sector of SSA countries positively if a sufficient level of institutional quality is prevalent. If a country lacks institutional quality, RFI negatively affects the size of the financial sector. However, we cannot identify any particular positive effect on the size of the private financial sector. Furthermore, we did not find a significant effect of RFI on the efficiency of the banking sector, or on the size and efficiency of stock markets. Notes: Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, ***significant at 1 percent. Dependent variable is the average growth rate of financial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, and otherwise 0. Notes: Point estimates from OLS; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, ***significant at 1 percent. Dependent variable is the average growth rate of financial development between 2004 and 2008. RFI is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1, if a country is member of an RFI project, and otherwise 0. 
RFI and financing conditions for enterprises
There is a rich empirical literature investigating the effects of international financial integration on access to finance in less developed countries and emerging markets, mostly focusing on the effects of penetration by financial institutions from advanced countries (see e.g. Clarke et al. 2006; Detragiache et al., 2008; Degryse et al., 2009) . The role of RFI for credit constraints of firms has mainly been examined for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. De Haas and Naaborg, 2005, 2006; Volz, 2004 Volz, , 2008 . To our knowledge, however, there are no studies investigating the effects of RFI on firms' access to finance in SSA countries.
Data and methodology
To measure the effect of RFI on financing conditions in SSA we use the following specification:
The set of variables and the algebraic structure are based on Volz (2008) but were modified for our purposes. The variables are constructed as follows.
Financing Conditions: FC j denotes the financing condition of country j, i.e. the variable describes how hard and costly it is for enterprises to obtain funds. To calculate an indicator form this variable we use micro data from enterprise surveys conducted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank (2010). They include data from about 13,000 enterprises from 34 SSA countries regarding access to finance and costs of finance. In those surveys, interviewed entrepreneurs indicated whether they perceive access to finance as "no obstacle", a "minor obstacle", a "moderate obstacle", a "major obstacle", or a "very severe obstacle". These are our access to finance data. Moreover, the interviewees were asked to estimate the average amount of collateral which they have to pay relative to the amount of loan. These are the costs of finance data. The enterprise surveys also distinguish between three different sizes of enterprises (small, medium, and large). Small are those enterprises with less than 20 employees, large enterprises have more than 100 employees, and the others are medium. We aggregate the access to finance data and calculate the following ratios:
where e j denotes the numbers of enterprises in country j, se j the number of small enterprises, and le j the number of large enterprises. The variables with an asterisk denote the number of credit constrained enterprises. Enterprises are classified as credit constrained when they describe access to finance as a "severe obstacle" in the enterprise survey. Thus, for instance, le * j is defined as the number of large enterprises in country j that face credit constraints. Therefore, AF j denotes the share of enterprises facing credit constraint. AFSMALL j is the fraction of the small enterprises facing credit constraint, and AFLARGE j the fraction of large enterprises facing credit constraint to all large enterprises.
Furthermore, we use the use the costs of finance data to calculate the following ratios:
where i is the set of all firms, s and l are the sets of small firms and large firms, respectively. They are therefore subsets of i. n j denotes the number of all firms i, m j denotes the number of small firms s, and k j denotes the number of large firms l; all of them in country j. ci j , cs j , and cl j are the amounts of collateral paid by enterprises i, s, and l, respectively. Thus, CF j denotes the average relative collateral of all firms, CFSMALL j the average relative collateral of small firms, and CFLARGE j the average relative collateral paid by large firms.
RFI:
For RFI j we use the same dummy variable as before. As discussed above, there are various theoretical predictions for the effects of RFI on access to and costs of finance. Therefore, from a theoretical viewpoint, the coefficient estimate can be either positive or negative.
Concentration in the banking sector: CON j represents the concentration in country j's banking sector measured by the amount of assets held by the three largest banks compared to the assets of the total banking sector. The data source is again Beck et al. (2010) . As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the large bank barriers hypothesis predicts that banking concentration should have a negative effect on the access to finance and a positive effect on the costs of finance of finance for small businesses (i.e., raise the cost of finance), as well as a positive effect on the access to finance and a negative effect on the costs of finance of large enterprises. In contrast, the monopolistic creditor hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) , argues that a monopolistic creditor can expect firms that obtain a credit today to remain customers in the future. Since young (and thus small) firms have low actual cash flows and potentially high future cash flows, a monopolistic creditor can take this aspect into account when making loan decisions: it can charge actual interest rates which are lower than what would be the market interest rate in a comparable competitive situation, and it can charge interest rates which are higher than the competitive market rates in the future. In a competitive banking sector, a bank has to require market interest rates. The higher future interest rates would drive away the then larger (and more credit worthy) businesses to other banks. This leads to higher interest rates for small, young, and risky debtors in a competitive market than in a monopolistic one. For the CON j variable we can, therefore, explain both directions of the outcome.
Foreign bank involvement: FBI j stands for the foreign bank involvement in country j. We include this variable to test the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis outlined earlier. Akin to the large bank barriers hypothesis, the foreign bank barrier hypothesis asserts that a dominant role of foreign banks should have a negative effect on small enterprises' access to finance and a positive effect on their costs of finance, as well as a positive effect on the access to finance of large enterprises and a negative effect on their financing costs. On the other hand, a large part of the literature highlights the positive effects of foreign bank entry on the efficiency of the whole banking sector. According to this view, a more efficient allocation of credit should therefore have a positive effect on the credit conditions regardless of firm size. Therefore, we have two possible outcomes for the coefficient estimate of the FBIj variable. We calculate an indicator for FBI j on the basis of data provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2010) . As a proxy we use the ratio of the amount of assets held by foreign banks to the amount of assets of the ten largest banks registered by the BankScope database. The calculation method is in line with Yeyati et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2002) , since "data for the whole banking system [...] are highly correlated with the data for the top ten banks" (Yeyati et al., 2004, p. 5) .
1 Cross-border credit: CBC j is the cross border credit extended to country j, that is, the amount of loans from external banks reported to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in country j as a share of its GDP. The source is Beck et al. (2010) . Cross-border credit should theoretically improve firm's access to and lower their cost of finance. We thus expect to obtain negative coefficient estimates.
State-owned banks: SOBj captures the role of state-owned banks, measured as the amount of assets of state-owned banks relative to the amount of assets of the entire banking sector. For the calculation we use the same method as for FBI j , again using BankScope data provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2010) . On the one hand, state-owned banks can play a crucial role in providing access to finance, when there is an insufficient institutional environment and a lot of "fraudulent bankruptcy" (Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 19) leading to little acceptance of the private banking sector by the public. In such a case the government can fulfill the role of financial intermediator. Furthermore, state-owned banks are more isolated from market forces and can therefore focus on other goals than profit maximisation (see Volz, 2008) . Those goals can include redistribution motives and therefore stateowned banks can be more willing to lend to small enterprises. On the other hand, the focus of stateowned banks on other goals than profit maximisation can have adverse effects on financing conditions for small enterprises. Firstly, it may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (La Porta et al., 2002) , and secondly, it is not evident that the political goals of the government direct the fund flows of state-owned bank in a direction which is beneficial for small enterprises. For example, state-owned banks might tend to engage in lending to influential political actors or larger enterprises. This consequently leads to an exclusion of small businesses. Therefore, the variable SOBj can have a positive (negative) effect on access to finance (costs of finance), as well as a negative (positive).
Financial deepening: PCGDP j is the financial deepening in country j. As before, it is calculated as the amount of private credit provided by commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions as a share of GDP (PCGDP). The source is Beck et al. (2010) . Since a deepening of financial markets should increase the availability of funds for enterprises, we expect to find a positive coefficient for this variable.
Macroeconomic stability: CPI j represents the macroeconomic instability of the respective country measured by the CPI average for the period 2004 to 2008. The data are taken from the World Bank (2010c) World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance. Since macroeconomic instability increases the risk of investment, financial institutions will ask for a higher risk premium or collateral. We should thus expect positive coefficient estimates.
Macroeconomic performance: GROWTH j denotes the average macroeconomic performance of country j between 2001 and 2008, measured by the real annual GDP growth rate. Higher economic growth is typically driven by higher investment rates. On the other hand, higher growth rates also invoke an increase in investment, since they alter investor's expectations. We use an eight-year average, accounting for lagged effects (World Bank 2010c). We expect a negative coefficient for this variable.
Other constraints: OTHCONS denotes other constraints to the economic activities of enterprises, i.e. it represents conditions other than credit constraint that might negatively affect the entrepreneurial activities of the interviewees. This variable takes into account that the indicator of the access to finance variable is based on a subjective survey. Therefore, it is possible that interviewees in some countries perceive the constraint of access to finance as less severe, because other conditions are even more harmful for their business activities. This view is based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who argue that the underlying value function that determines the judgment of an economic actor includes a reference point which can vary depending on the context. For instance, if we assume two economies (A and B) where financial institutions have the same willingness to provide loans to enterprises, but the enterprises in country A face problems with an epidemic diseases which affects a significant percentage of its working population, while this is not the case in country B, this will lead, other things equal, to a lower perceived negative value of credit constraints by the enterprises in country B. Since we cannot include several variables that could adversely affect business conditions in SSA due our small sample size (n = 34), we decide to include the number of AIDS death in 2008 per population as a proxy for other constraints on business activities.
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This choice is based on the empirical evidence of the negative effects of AIDS on entrepreneurial activities (e.g., Fraser et al., 2002) , and the relatively broad availability of data.
3 Including a variable for the number of AIDS deaths makes sense also for another reason: it would be rationale for banks to curtail lending to small businesses, which typically rely on its owner, if they have to fear that the latter would fall sick and therefore may not be able to repay. This reasoning would not hold for large businesses, since these would not be expected to go bankrupt because of the illness of parts of the management. We thus may also expect to find a negative effect of the OTHCONS variable on financing conditions, since banks might decide to provide less loans when a high rate of AIDS is prevalent. From a theoretical angle, an outcome in both directions is possible for the coefficient estimate of OTHCONS. Table 5 .6 gives an overview of the descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables. 
Results
Table 5.7 depicts the regression results. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for the access to finance regression; Columns 4 to 6 for the costs of finance regression. We find a relatively high adjusted R square for all dependent variables except AFLARGE j and CF j . We also test for robustness against outliers applying the same method as before. Furthermore, we face no problems with multicollinearity.
The results show no significant effect of RFI on access to finance of all firms in the aggregate. We also find no significant effect on the credit conditions of large enterprises. However, there is a significant positive effect of RFI on the credit constraints of small enterprises (AFSMALL j ), suggesting that RFI impedes small firms' access to finance. Furthermore, there is a significant positive influence of foreign bank involvement on the severity of the credit constraint for small enterprises, while we don't find such an influence for large enterprises. These results provide some support for the foreign bank barrier hypothesis in the context of RFI.
We find no evidence for the large bank barriers hypothesis in the context of RFI based on the arguments of Berger et al. (2001) and Chick and Dow (1994) . We do find a negative coefficient for CON j on large banks' access to finance, suggesting that concentration in the banking sector serves large banks well, but this effect is not significant.
A surprising result is the positive coefficient estimate for PCGDP j , which is significant for small firms and hence indicating a negative influence of financial deepening on access to finance for small enterprises.
Furthermore, we find significant results for the variables CPI j and GROWTH j that are in line with theoretical predictions. Higher macroeconomic instability negatively affects the credit conditions for all enterprises in aggregate (that is, we find the expected coefficient estimates for CPI j ). This effect is mainly driven by the negative effects on small enterprises. In addition, we find that better macroeconomic performance leads to a reduction of credit constraints for enterprises. If we distinguish between large and small enterprises, we find that the effect is significant for small enterprises but not for large ones. Finally, the negative estimates for OTHCONS support the theory that other constraints lead to a lower perception of the severity of credit constraints. As we see in Columns 1, 2, and 3 its coefficient is negative and significant for AF j , AFSMALL j , and AFLARGE j .
Turning to the costs of finance regression analysis, we obtain the following results. There are no significant effects of RFI on the costs of finance of all firms in the aggregate, or on the financing costs of large and small firms.
However, we now find a negative effect of foreign bank involvement on the costs of finance. This result is puzzling, since one might assume costs of finance and access to finance to be influenced by all variables in the same way, since we assumed that both are indicators for the same construct, i.e. financing conditions. A possible explanation is credit rationing. As pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates and collateral are also more likely to engage in risky project (the so called adverse selection effect). If interest rates or collateral requirements exceed a certain level the average risk of the loan portfolio of banks, the expected loss exceeds the bank's expected return. Therefore, banks require interest rates and collateral requirements below this level even if this implies an unsatisfied excess demand for credit. Instead of raising interest rates or collateral requirements banks deny loans to borrowers based on qualitative aspects.
We can support this argument by calculating the correlation coefficients of the costs of finance and the access to finance variables. The results show that there is virtually no correlation between access to finance and costs of finance.
1 This supports the notion that small enterprises find it hard to get access to finance, although costs of finance are low. We can further support this notion by looking at the micro data before aggregation. We find that those enterprises describing access to finance as a very severe obstacle also tended to leave the question for the amount of collateral unanswered.
2 This implies that collateral is not the primary reason for the perceived credit constraint. Thus, credit rationing can be an explanation for the seemingly contradictory regression results.
From this point of view the results of the costs of finance regression do not contradict the results of the access to finance regression. The two dependent variables merely represent two different aspects of the financing conditions of enterprises. Therefore we can interpret the results in accordance with the foreign bank barriers hypothesis in the context of RFI.
For the control variables we find the following results. We uncover a negative effect of CBC j on costs of finance of small enterprises. This is in line with the theoretical predictions stated above. In addition, we find a negative coefficient for financial deepening, which means that financial deepening lowers the costs of finance of small and large firms. Whereas this is in line with theoretical predictions, it points, however, in the opposite direction than the access to finance regression, just like RFIj and FBIj.
The CPI j results are surprising. On the one hand, we find a positive CPI j coefficient for the costs of finance for large enterprises. This is in line with the theoretical proposition that macroeconomic instability increases the riskiness of investment projects and therefore the amount of collateral required by banks or the risk premium they demand. On the other hand, we find a significant negative effect of CPI j on the costs of finance of small enterprises. A possible explanation is that inflation reduces the real cost of credit for debtors. But this would apply also to large firms. Moreover, it would imply that banks are not sufficiently pricing in inflation risk.
The variable OTHCONS j should not have an effect on the costs of finance from a theoretical perspective. Indeed, the effect of OTHCONS j vanishes when the dependent variable is changed from CF j to AF j , and AFSMALL j to CFSMALL j , respectively. The only exception is CFLARGE which is significantly affected by the ratio of AIDS death to population. This supports the notion that large businesses also suffer from the effects of a high level of AIDS on their human capital. Banks can take that into account and require higher collateral even from large businesses when the AIDS death level is high.
Summing up, our results provide support to the notion that RFI has adverse effects on the access to finance for small enterprises. We could not find a significant effect of RFI on access to finance for large enterprises or all enterprises in aggregate. Furthermore, we find that RFI reduces the costs of finance of small as well as large enterprise, but we argue that this effect reaches only a fraction of small firms since many small enterprises are excluded from access to financial due to credit rationing.
Conclusions
This study provides an analysis of the costs and benefits of RFI for the financial sectors of SSA countries. We have tested two hypotheses from the literature on general financial openness. The first hypothesis states that RFI entails financial development; the second that it has adverse effects on the financing conditions of small enterprises. We have identified CMA, EAC, UEMOA, and CEMAC as four RECs that engage in RFI more than other economic communities in SSA. Subsequently, we analysed how the membership in one of these four RFI projects explains cross-country differences in financial development as well as access to and costs of finance for small and large enterprises.
With regard to the relation between RFI and financial development, the results suggest that RFI contributes to the overall size of the financial sector if a certain level of institutional quality is prevalent. If such a level of institutional quality was lacking, we found a negative effect of RFI on financial development. However, the results apply only to a very broad measure of the size of the financial sector, including the liabilities of the central banks. We could not identify any particular significant effect on the size of the private financial sector. Moreover, a significant influence of RFI on the efficiency of the banking sector could not be identified.
Regarding the analysis of the effects of RFI on access to and costs of finance of enterprises in SSA, results were mixed. Whereas RFI shows a positive effect on credit constraints measured by the subjective assessment of small enterprises, we found no effect on credit constraints measured in terms of small enterprises' costs of finance. Furthermore, there is a significant positive influence of foreign bank involvement on the severity of the credit constraint for small enterprises, but a negative effect on their costs of finance. We interpreted the results as an indication of the exclusion of small enterprises from funds while the overall level of costs of finance remained modest. From this point of view, the analysis provides some support for the foreign-owned bank barrier hypothesis stating that RFI and the corresponding penetration of the integrating country by foreign banks impede the financing conditions of small enterprises.
Data availability has been a severe constraint in investigating the research question. Most notably, the lack of data on bilateral capital flows prevented us from constructing an indicator of the de facto level of RFI between SSA countries. The resulting reliance on a dummy variable as an indicator of de jure RFI is certainly the most severe limitation of this research project. In particular, it does not allow for differentiation of various stages of RFI in the analysis. Moreover, the qualitative construction of the dummy is certainly contestable. Advocates of integration projects like SADC might point out that the treaties and agreements of this large REC resemble those of the EAC. We agree with this notion, yet, we wish to underline the importance of overlapping membership as an impeding factor for RFI.
Apart from the RFI project definition and the dummy variable, sample size is also a problem. Since the regression analysis estimated many insignificant relationships, we would require a larger sample to identify significant relationships. This also implies that we could not include more explanatory variables in the analysis.
Furthermore, the analysis faced the problem of possible conflation of RFI with other politico economic indicators that could also influence the dependent variables. For example, RFI is typically accompanied by trade integration processes that can also affect financial development (cf. Beck, 2002) .
The limitations to the analysis highlight the need for further data collection and further empirical research. With regard to data collection, our research emphasises that more data on bilateral capital flows in SSA are the main bottleneck for investigating the effects of RFI. With regard to further research, our study shows that there are also potentially detrimental effects of RFI that are worth to be examined further for SSA.
Despite the limitations of this work, our research contributes first empirical evidence to the debate on financial developments effects of RFI in SSA. The study highlights a neglected aspect of RFI in SSA: its impact on the financing conditions for small enterprises. In contradiction to the widespread opinion that RFI will benefit all parties involved, our work suggests that RFI may in some cases have little benefit or even adverse effects for small enterprises. This notion is important for the academic discourse on RFI, but even more so for the political sphere. RFI enjoys high priority on the political agenda of various SSA countries. Our research suggests that further discussion on the costs and benefits of RFI is needed to avoid unexpected social costs in terms of higher inequality.
